Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
Volume 13
Issue 2 Winter 1982

Article 4

1982

In re Estate of Gowling and In re Estate of Grant: The
Limits of Equitable Apportionment
Patricia Brosterhous

Follow this and additional works at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Estate and Gift Commons
Recommended Citation
Patricia Brosterhous, In re Estate of Gowling and In re Estate of Grant: The Limits of Equitable Apportionment, 13 Loy. U. Chi. L. J. 309
(1982).
Available at: http://lawecommons.luc.edu/luclj/vol13/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by LAW eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola University Chicago Law Journal
by an authorized administrator of LAW eCommons. For more information, please contact law-library@luc.edu.

NOTES
In re Estate of Gowling and In re Estate of
Grant: The Limits of Equitable Apportionment
INTRODUCTION

The federal estate tax' is a tax imposed upon the transfer of
property at death.2 The tax attaches to the estate before distribution, and is imposed upon the decedent's right to transmit his
property.3 The extent of federal estate tax liability depends upon
the character of the property interest being transferred, and that
character is largely determined under state law.' With a few specific exceptions, 5 federal law does not address how the federal estate tax should be distributed within an estate. Instead, state law
determines which estate sources will bear the burden of the tax.'
Although a number of gifts which pass outside of probate are
included in valuing a decedent's gross estate7 and computing his
1. The federal estate tax was first levied under the Revenue Act of 1916, Pub. L. No.
271, 39 Stat. 756 (1916). Its constitutionality was upheld in New York Trust Co. v. Eisner,
256 U.S. 345, 349-50 (1921). The purpose of the estate tax is to tax the gratuitous transmission of wealth, since Congress expressly excluded gifts, bequests, and inheritances from the
scope of the federal income tax. I.R.C. § 102.
2. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 81-83 (1899).
3. Young Men's Christian Ass'n v. Davis, 264 U.S. 47 (1923); New York Trust Co. v.
Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921). Since the federal estate tax is, as an estate tax, a tax on the
transfer of property, rather than an inheritance tax based on the ownership of property,
Eisner deemed the tax indirect, not requiring apportionment, and hence constitutional.
4. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967); Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154 (1942);
Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940). As expressed in Morgan, "state law creates
legal interests and rights. The federal revenue acts designate what interests or rights, so
created, shall be taxed." 309 U.S. at 80.
5. The exceptions found in the Internal Revenue Code provide for proportional recovery
of tax payments from life insurance beneficiaries, and recipients of property over which the
decedent had a power of appointment. I.R.C. §§ 2206, 2207. The Economic Recovery Tax
Act of 1981 provides, in new I.R.C. § 2207A, for proportional recovery from certain property
for which a marital deduction has been previously allowed [hereinafter referred to as Economic Recovery Tax Act].
6. Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95 (1942).
7. The law of property distinguishes between probate and nonprobate property, while
the law of federal taxation is concerned with the concept of the gross estate. Probate prop-
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estate tax, Illinois law has traditionally required that, absent directions from the decedent, the estate tax be paid from the residuary
probate estate.8 Under this approach, sometimes referred to as the
burden on the residue rule, nonprobate bequests are not burdened
and reduced by federal estate taxes. However, in the January, 1978
decision of Roe v. Estate of Farrell, the Illinois Supreme Court
adopted the principle of "equitable apportionment"' 0 in holding

erty is generally property owned outright by the decedent at his death, which necessarily
has not been the subject of lifetime transfers. Probate property therefore passes through a
will, or under the statute of descent and distribution. Nonprobate property, on the other
hand, passes regardless of will or statute; living trusts, joint tenancies with rights of survivorship, life insurance proceeds, and transfers made by the decedent by deed are the most
obvious examples of nonprobate property.
The concept of the "gross estate" is expansive, and encompasses both probate and nonprobate property. Specifically, the gross estate includes the value of all property in which
the decedent had an interest at the time of his death, regardless of whether the law of
property characterizes that interest as probate or nonprobate. I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2033. Indeed,
in defining the gross estate, the Code reaches far to include as many nonprobate transfers as
possible. The gross estate includes certain transfers made within three years of decedent's
death, transfers the decedent made with a retained life estate or which take effect on death,
or revocable transfers. I.R.C. §§ 2035, 2036, 2037, 2038. The gross estate also includes the
value of certain annuities, joint interests, certain property over which the decedent had a
general power of appointment, life insurance proceeds, and any transfers made for less than
adequate consideration. I.R.C. §§ 2039, 2040, 2041, 2042, 2043. Furthermore § 2044 [as
added by the Economic Recovery Tax Act, supra note 5] now includes the value of qualified
terminable interest property for which a marital deduction was previously claimed, in valuing the gross estate.
8. The burden on the residue rule requires that intestate assets and residuary assets
under the will (that is, all of the property not disposed through specific or general bequests,
or through nonprobate transactions) be the primary sources called upon to satisfy the federal estate tax liability, where a decedent has expressed no indication to the contrary in his
will. First Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943); In re Estate of Fairchild,
21 Ill. App. 3d 459, 315 N.E.2d 658 (1974); In re Estate of Phillips, 1 111. App. 3d 813, 275
N.E.2d 685 (1971).
9. 69 Ill. 2d 525, 372 N.E.2d 662 (1978).
10. Equitable apportionment is a multi-faceted doctrine under which the burden of the
federal estate tax is equitably distributed among various estate assets. Equitable apportionment has been adopted judicially in several jurisdictions, but is more often a creature of
statute. Its meaning thus varies in nearly as many ways as there are jurisdictions which
embrace it. For a general discussion of the questions raised by equitable apportionment, see
Carroll, The Interplay of Probate Assets and Nonprobate Assets in the Administration of
a Decedent's Estate, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 363 (1975); Fleming, Apportionment of Federal
Estate Taxes, 43 ILL. L. REV. 153 (1948); Powell, Ultimate Liability for Federal Estate
Taxes, 1958 WASH. U.L.Q. 327 (1958).
In general terms, a jurisdiction which has adopted equitable apportionment will apply
either "partial" or "total" apportionment. With "partial" apportionment, tax liability of the
nonprobate estate is determined and apportioned pro rata, but taxes for which the probate
estate is liable are drawn strictly from residuary sources, or according to local rules of abatement. Where apportionment is "total," every asset, whether probate or nonprobate, contributes pro rata to the payment of taxes.
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that, in intestate estates, nonprobate assets will contribute to the
payment of taxes. In In re Estate of Gowling" and In re Estate of
Grant,1 2 two conflicting decisions involving property passing to
surviving spouses, the court again addressed the issue of equitable
apportionment. Gowling and Grant further defined and limited the
doctrine of equitable apportionment in Illinois.
This comment will examine and assess the current status of the
law of equitable apportionment in Illinois. The Roe decision will be
reviewed, and some of the questions it left unanswered will be
identified. The Gowling and Grant decisions will be examined and
compared, focusing on whether the conclusions drawn are reconcilable. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn regarding the present
and future state of the law of equitable apportionment in Illinois.
BACKGROUND

The burden on the residue rule requires that intestate or
residual assets be the primary source for the payment of taxes
where a decedent has expressed no contrary direction in his will.
Because certain lifetime transfers are included in determining federal estate tax liability,"3 application of the rule often meant that a
testator could intentionally or unintentionally disinherit residuary
takers by omitting directions in his will regarding the payment of
taxes. Indeed, in an estate rich in nonprobate assets, general and
even specific bequests would
abate in order to pay the tax gener14
ated by nonprobate gifts.

A similar result occurs in the intestacy context. If a decedent
made substantial lifetime transfers and then died intestate, traditional Illinois law required that his probate (intestate) estate
would bear the burden of the federal tax, although its liability was
largely based on the lifetime nonprobate transfers. Thus, heirs-atlaw under the statute of descent and distribution could be effectively disinherited, in that their shares could be completely consumed through the payment of taxes on nonprobate gifts. Such
Currently, thirty-four states provide for some type of apportionment by statute, and four
rely upon judicial rules. For a listing, see [19801 INHER. EST. & GIFr TAX REP. (CCH) 1 2030.
See also, Annot., 71 A.L.R. 3d 247 (1976). For a discussion of the Roe decision and an
evaluation of various statutory approaches, see Comment, Equitable Apportionment of
Federal Tax Liability: The Necessity for Clarifying Legislation, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 703.
11. 82 Ill. 2d 15, 411 N.E.2d 266 (1980).
12. 83 Ill. 2d 379, 415 N.E.2d 416 (1980).
13. See note 7 supra.
14. See note 52 infra.
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was the context of Roe v. Estate of Farrell.
ROE V. ESTATE OF FARRELL

In Roe v. Estate of Farrell, the decedent died intestate, leaving
considerable property in joint tenancy. 15 The federal estate tax due
exceeded the value of the intestate probate assets.16 The administratrix sought proportionate contribution from the joint tenants
for taxes which the probate assets could not possibly cover.1" Her
request was not without precedent, for in a similar case four years
earlier, the First District in In re Estate of Van Duserl8 had
granted such an apportionment. Following this precedent, the
supreme court held that, in intestate estates, nonprobate assets
would contribute pro rata to the payment of tax liabilities they
generated.1" The court affirmed the circuit court's order of equitable apportionment of the estate tax between the joint tenants and
the heirs-at-law of the intestate estate.
Three factors were key to the Roe analysis: the doctrine of equitable contribution, 20 legislative intent,2 1 and reliance upon and acceptance of the Van Duser holding.2 2 With respect to the doctrine
of equitable contribution, the Roe court cited Van Duser, which
held that "[1]ogic, reason, and simple justice dictate that

. . .

the

doctrine of equitable contribution should be invoked as to nonprobate assets to fairly distribute the federal estate tax burden.

23

It

was significant to the Roe court that the nonprobate assets generated a large part of the tax liability. In its application of the doc15. 69 Ill. 2d at 528, 372 N.E.2d at 663.
16. Id.
17. Id. The executor is liable for payment of the estate tax. I.R.C. § 2002.
18. 19 II. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E.2d 228 (1974). For a discussion of Van Duser and the
Illinois cases dealing with apportionment preceeding it, see Fleming, Apportionment of
Federal Estate Taxes in Illinois-CurrentStatus and Drafting Suggestions, 63 ILL. B.J.
522 (1975).
19. 69 IlI. 2d at 532, 372 N.E.2d at 665.
20. The keystone of the equitable principles as expressed by the Roe court was found in
a section from J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE, § 411 (5th ed. 1942); equality is equity.
The Roe court stated:
This doctrine is evidently based upon the notion that the burden in all cases
should be equally borne by all the persons upon whom it is imposed, and its necessary effect is to equalize that burden whenever one of the parties has, in the
pursuance of his mere legal liability, paid or been compelled to pay the whole
amount, or any amount greater than his proportionate share.
69 Ill. 2d at 532, 372 N.E.2d at 665-66.
21. Id. at 530-32, 372 N.E.2d at 665.
22. Id. at 532, 372 N.E.2d at 665.
23. Id., quoting In re Estate of Van Duser, 19 Ill.
App. 3d at 1023, 313 N.E.2d at 229.
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trine of equitable contribution, the Roe court recognized the frequent confusion surrounding the imposition of the federal estate
tax, as compared to the imposition of an inheritance tax. Although
the federal estate tax is conceptually a tax upon the transfer of the
"corpus" of the estate, its practical effect is similar to that of an
inheritance tax. Even though an heir or beneficiary does not directly pay the tax, because it is a tax upon the decedent's transfer
and not upon the beneficiary's receipt, the payment of the tax has
the practical effect of reducing distributive shares. Invoking the
principle that "equality is equity," the court pointed to pro rata
contribution from the beneficiaries' shares as the equitable way of
distributing the estate tax burden. 4
In examining legislative intent, the Roe court first looked to section 18-14 of the Illinois Probate Act,2 5 which charges all of a decedent's real and personal estate with the estate tax. The appellate
court had construed this section to require an exhaustion of probate assets before nonprobate sources could be used to pay taxes .2
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, concluded that this section
did not manifest any legislative intent that the federal estate tax
burden must invariably fall upon the probate assets. 7 Rather, in
the court's view, the section simply abolished an archaic distinction between a decedent's real and personal property in estate administration.28 The court then examined section 18-10, which classifies the priority of claims made against a decedent's estate.2 9 The

Roe court held that this section was "completely unrelated to the
question of whether the burden of the federal estate tax should be
apportioned." ' 0 The court concluded that since the legislature had
24. See note 20 supra. The meaning of "equality is equity" would change, however, as it
was applied subsequently to different situations.
25. Section 18-14 of the Illinois Probate Act provides:
All the real and personal estate of the decedent and the income therefrom during
the period of administration are chargeable with the claims against the estate,
expenses of administration, estate and inheritance taxes and legacies without distinction except as otherwise provided in this Act ...
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,18-14 (1979).
26. 69 Ill. 2d at 530-31, 372 N.E.2d at 665.
27. 69 Ill. 2d at 531, 372 N.E.2d at 665.
28. Id.
29. Id. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 2, 18-10 (1979) provides:

"All claims against the estate of a decedent are divided into classes in the manner following
3rd: Debts due the United States."
30. 69 Ill. 2d at 531, 372 N.E.2d at 665.
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not in fact addressed the apportionment issue, there was nothing
in the statute to preclude the court from requiring the surviving
joint tenants to contribute their proportionate share of the estate
tax.31
The third key aspect of the Roe analysis was the reliance upon
the Van Duser decision throughout the legal profession. 2 The
court found that this reliance, as evidenced by numerous treatises
and handbooks for practicing lawyers, "has not been misplaced,
and that the Van Duser court was correct in making an equitable
apportionment."3 In Roe, therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court officially sanctioned the equitable apportionment of federal estate
taxes between probate and nonprobate assets.
The adoption of equitable apportionment in Roe left unanswered many questions as .to the application of this concept in varying fact situations. First, the decision did not address the question of whether apportionment would apply between probate and
nonprobate assets in a testate estate. Second, it left unclear
whether, and to what extent, equitable apportionment would modify the rule that the tax burden should fall upon an estate's residuary assets. 4 Third, the court did not specifically address how apportionment would affect the share passing to a surviving spouse,
which typically generates no federal estate tax. 8
In two 1980 apportionment cases, In re Estate of Gowling and
In re Estate of Grant,3 7 the Illinois Supreme Court supplied some
answers to these questions. Gowling left no doubt that apportionment between probate and nonprobate assets would apply in tes31. Id.
32. 69 Ill.
2d at 532, 372 N.E.2d at 665.
33. Id.
34. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
35. In determining the taxable estate, I.R.C. § 2056 allows a deduction from the adjusted
gross estate of the value of the property passing to the surviving spouse, within certain
limits. I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A)(i) limits the amount of the deduction to the greater of
$250,000, or one-half of the adjusted gross estate. The Economic Recovery Tax Act, supra
note 5, abolishes these limits, and provides for an unlimited marital deduction for decedents
dying after December 31, 1981. The old limits will remain effective with respect to wills
executed before September 13, 1981, which utilize marital deduction formula clauses.
Given this, the property passing to the spouse in a sense "generates" no tax. Therefore,
under the equality is equity principle, which requires that no one pay any amount greater
than his proportionate share, the surviving spouse's share arguably should not be compelled
to contribute to the payment of any tax. See note 20 supra. Thus, an important question
asked after Roe was whether equitable apportionment would preserve the spousal share intact and shift the burden of the taxes to other devisees.
36. 82 Ill. 2d 15, 411 N.E.2d 266 (1980).
37. 83 Ill. 2d 379, 415 N.E.2d 416 (1980).
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tate estates, but at the same time did not completely dismiss the
burden on the residue rule. Although Gowling exempted the share
passing to the surviving spouse from contribution toward the federal estate tax, Grant demonstrated that this exemption would not
apply in all cases.
In re ESTATE OF GOWLING

In re Estate of Gowling involved a decedent who left a will
which contained no express provision for the payment of the federal estate tax. Decedent's gross estate was valued at close to onehalf million dollars. Probate assets represented only a minor portion of this amount.3 8 The will provided for specific bequests to
decedent's surviving (second) wife and to his son, and granted a
small residuary share to his daughter.3 9 The bulk of the estate consisted of nonprobate remainder interests in real estate passing to
the testator's son and daughter, 40 although some miscellaneous
nonprobate property also passed to the surviving spouse.' Federal
tax liability, assessed at over $72,000, was attributable primarily to
the nonprobate property.4' This tax assessment far exceeded the
value of the residuary assets under the will; indeed, it exceeded the
total value of the probate estate. 3
After a hearing, the circuit court ruled that federal estate taxes
should be paid from probate assets to the extent such assets were
sufficient. 44 The circuit court never reached the issue of apportionment because it reasoned that a provision in the decedent's will
giving his executor power to "settle claims in favor of or against
my estate" meant that the testator wished his estate tax to be paid
entirely by probate assets.45 Since, under section 18-10 of the Illinois Probate Act, "amounts due the federal government" represented a class of claims against the estate, the court concluded that
the testator's grant of power to the executor to settle claims implicitly meant that he intended that probate assets be used to pay
38. 82 Ill. 2d at 18, 411 N.E.2d at 267.
39. 77 Ill. App. 3d 548, 549, 396 N.E.2d 82, 83 (1979).
40. Id.
41. 82 Ill. 2d at 18, 411 N.E.2d at 267; 77 Ill. App. 3d at 550, 396 N.E.2d at 83. The
remainder interests in real estate comprised approximately eighty percent of the gross
estate.
42. 82 Ill. 2d at 18, 411 N.E.2d at 267. See note 41 supra.
43. Id. Probate property totalled about $70,000; the residue amounted to about $1,200.
44. Id. at 19, 411 N.E.2d at 268; 77 Ill. App. 3d at 550-51, 396 N.E.2d at 84.
45. 77 Ill. App. 3d at 550, 396 N.E.2d at 84. The appellate court thought the question
was one of first impression in Illinois. 77 Ill. App. 3d at 551-53, 396 N.E.2d at 85.
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estate taxes."
The spouse appealed the circuit court's order, seeking an equitable apportionment of the taxes between the probate and nonprobate estate, and at the same time arguing that she be exempted
from such apportionment. The spouse contended that she should
not required to contribute to the payment of any federal estate
tax, since her interest qualified for the marital deduction, 7 and
thus did not generate any tax liability.""
The Appellate Court Decision
The appellate court agreed with the spouse, and reversed the circuit court's holding.4" Rejecting the contention that the testator
had expressed any direction for the payment of taxes, the court
held that, with the exception of any property qualifying for the
marital deduction, both probate and nonprobate assets should be
charged with the federal tax liability. 50
In re-examining the burden on the residue rule, the court held
that the rule was still applicable for any tax attributable to probate assets. Thus, the residue would be charged first with any
taxes apportioned to the probate estate. 51 The court then held
that, if residuary assets were extinguished by taxes, the balance
would be paid from the remaining probate assets in accordance
with the traditional rules of abatement.5" Faced with bearing virtually the entire burden of the federal tax, the recipients of the remainder interests in real estate appealed the appellate court
46. 82 Ill. 2d at 19, 411 N.E.2d at 268.
47. Id. at 20, 411 N.E.2d at 268.
48. 77 Ill. App. 3d at 553-54, 396 N.E.2d at 86.
49. 77 Ill. App. 3d 548, 396 N.E.2d 82.
50. Id. at 554, 396 N.E.2d at 86.
51. Id.
52. Id. The rules of abatement are tied to the concept that legacies under a will are
defined by classes, the most important being specific bequests, and secondly, general bequests. A specific bequest is one which is unique, or which is capable of identification from
all other things of the same kind. A general bequest is usually of money, and can be satisfied
from any estate source, or through delivery of something of corresponding value. Specific
bequests are therefore of a higher class than general bequests. The rules of abatement provide that when any given class of legacies must abate because of an insufficiency, all bequests within that class abate pro rats. Baker v. Baker, 319 Ill. 320, 150 N.E. 284 (1925); In
re Estate of Fleer, 21 Il. App. 3d 56, 315 N.E.2d 260 (1974). See also ILL. Rav. STAT. ch.
1101/2, 1 24-3(b) (1979) which provides:
Unless otherwise provided by will, if the estate of a testator is insufficient to pay
all legacies under his will, specific legacies shall be satisfied pro rata before general
legacies, and general legacies shall be satisfied pro rata, without any priority in
either case as between real and personal estate.
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decision.
The Supreme Court Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court faced the same issues on appeal as
had the appellate court. First, the court had to determine whether
the doctrine of equitable apportionment between probate and nonprobate assets, as established by Roe, should apply to testate estates. Second, assuming apportionment applied, the court then had
to determine whether property which qualified for the marital deduction, passing in both the probate and nonprobate estates,
should be included in that apportionment; that is, whether it
should be charged with estate taxes which it had not generated.
Equitable Apportionment
The supreme court affirmed the appellate court on all three issues.5" It first rejected the circuit court's reasoning that the testator's giving his executor "power to settle claims in favor of my estate" meant that taxes be paid entirely from probate assets,
observing that this rationale had been rejected in Roe v. Farrell."
Finding that the testator had in fact expressed no direction as to
how taxes were to be paid, the Gowling court thus confronted the
issue of how estate taxes should be allocated in a testate estate.
Since the court in Roe had already construed sections 18-10 and
18-14 of the Probate Act 5" and found that the statutory language
did not preclude application of the doctrine of equitable apportionment, it was clear to the Gowling court that legislative intent
presented no obstacles to applying the doctrine to testate estates."
The court held that Roe was applicable, and that in the absence of
directions from the decedent, a proportionate share of federal es53. In re Estate of Gowling, 82 Ill. 2d 15, 411 N.E.2d 266 (1980).
54. Id. at 19, 411 N.E.2d at 268. The court's analogy to Roe can be criticized because
there it was construing the intentions of the legislature, and here it was construing the intentions of a testator. Although the Roe rationale can obviously be employed to set down a
rule of law in circumstances where the testator has not spoken, it hardly seems appropriate
to use this rationale as evidence that the testator has not spoken.
Interestingly, the appellate court resolved the problem by observing that it was unlikely a
testator would make specific bequests only to have them absorbed by taxes. 77 InI. App. 3d
at 552, 396 N.E.2d at 85. Had the supreme court accepted this rationale, it could have resolved the issue on the basis of a rule of construction; the intention to disinherit heirs must
be clearly expressed, and cannot be implied from ambiguous language. Dahmer v. Wensler,
350 Ill. 23, 182 N.E. 799 (1932); Smith v. Garber, 280 Ill. 67, 121 N.E. 173 (1918).
55. See notes 25-31 supra and accompanying text.
56. 82 Ill. 2d at 19, 21, 411 N.E.2d at 268, 269.
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tate tax liability should be borne by nonprobate assets. 7 The effect
of this holding was that the nonprobate assets, consisting largely of
remainder interests in real property and representing the bulk of
the taxable transfer, would bear most of the taxes.
Marital Deduction Property
The second essential question presented in Gowling was whether
probate and nonprobate shares transferred to the surviving spouse
should be included in apportionment. The Gowling widow received
probate as well as nonprobate property which qualified for the
marital deduction.59 Such transfers are deductible from the adjusted gross estate in determining the taxable estate, and effectively generate no federal tax liability."
The supreme court did not require contribution from the
spouse's share, but preserved it intact. In reaching its decision,
though, the Gowling court offered little original analysis. The court
relied heavily on the Court of Claims holding in Farley v. United
States.61 Citing Farley, the Gowling court added dimension to the
"equality is equity" principle in Illinois apportionment doctrine.
The court agreed that it would be "'inequitable to require a widow
whose property generated no tax to contribute to the payment of
tax generated by property received by others.' "162 Again citing Farley, the court observed that Illinois statutory and judicial policies
had traditionally protected the widow's interest from competing
57. Id. at 22, 411 N.E.2d at 269.
58. A troublesome aspect of such a rule is that it will sometimes work, as in Gowling,
upon non-cash property, and require recipients to satisfy the tax liability with cash from the
sale of that property or from outside sources.
59. I.R.C. § 2056(a) provides that: "[T]he value of the taxable estate shall ... be determined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any
interest in property which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving
spouse. .. "
60. Id. See note 76 infra.
61. 581 F.2d 821 (Ct. Cl. 1978). Decided shortly after Roe, Farley sought to interpret
Roe's principles of equitable contribution in light of a spouse's election against her husband's will. It asked whether, under Illinois law, a spouse's elective share would be estimated before or after taxes had been charged against the estate. Under the rule of Northern
Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 IlI. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951), Illinois law required that the
spousal share be calculated after the estate was reduced by taxes. See notes 87-91 infra and
accompanying text.
The Farley court believed, based upon the Roe decision, that Wilson had been reversed.
Although the Illinois court in Gowling cited Farley extensively, it reversed Farley on the
issue of spousal renunciation. See notes 99-113 infra and accompanying text.
62. 82 Ill. 2d at 23, 411 N.E.2d at 270, citing Farley v. United States, 581 F.2d 821, 834
(Ct. Cl. 1978).
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claims to her husband's estate. 63 The Gowling court further noted
that Congress intended that a portion of a decedent's property
pass to his spouse "'free of the burden of federal estate tax.' ""
The Gowling decision made clear that the federal tax liability
would be apportioned pro rata between both probate assets and
nonprobate assets, but that shares qualifying for the marital deduction would not be charged with federal estate taxes. A third
related question, however, was ignored by the supreme court. Although the court exempted marital deduction shares from apportionment, the court did not address which assets should bear the
tax burden allocated to the probate estate. Unlike the appellate
court, the supreme court in Gowling made no comment on the continued viability of the burden on the residue rule.
Burden on the Residue Rule
The appellate court in Gowling had reviewed the burden on the
residue rule, and concluded it was very much alive. 5 The appellate
court stated that although the residuary estate could no longer be
charged with tax generated by nonprobate assets, "[a]s between
the various probate assets distributed by the testator, Illinois follows the rule [that] the burden of federal estate taxes falls on re63. Id.
64. Id. citing 581 F.2d at 835. The court further supported its findings with an impressive list of citations from other jurisdictions. Id. at 23-24, 411 N.E.2d at 270. In doing so, the
court declared that it thereby joined "those courts which have held that a surviving spouse
is entitled to the benefits of the marital deduction undiminished by any part of the Federal
estate tax liability." Id. at 23, 411 N.E.2d at 270. Most of the cases cited by the court,
however, were not on point. Many involved the marital deduction in the context of shares
descending through intestacy. Estate of Whipple v. United States, 419 F.2d 494 (6th Cir.
1969); In re Estate of Collins, 269 F. Supp. 633 (D.D.C. 1967); First Nat'l Bank v. United
States, 233 F. Supp. 19 (D. Kan. 1964); Byars v. Mixon, 292 Ala. 657, 299 So. 2d 259 (1974);
In re Estate of Marks, 129 N.J. Super. 276, 322 A.2d 860 (1974).
The applicability of the marital deduction to intestate estates in Illinois differs from its
applicability to bequests under a will. See notes 135-147 infra and accompanying text.
The court also cited cases involving the applicability of the marital deduction to a forced
share. Robertson v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 955 (N.D. Ala. 1968); Weyenberg v. United
States, 135 F. Supp. 299 (E.D. Wis. 1955); Alexandria Nat'l Bank v. Thomas, 213 Va. 620,
194 S.E.2d 723 (1973); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, 240 S.W.2d 89 (Ky. App. 1951).
The court's reference to these authorities in Gowling had no impact upon the decision
regarding the marital deduction and statutory renunciation in Illinois. See notes 99-113 inIra and accompanying text.
65. 77 Ill. App. 3d at 552-53, 396 N.E.2d at 85-86. It referred to In re Estate of Fairchild,
App. 3d 813,
21 Ill. App. 3d 459, 315 N.E.2d 658 (1974) and In re Estate of Phillips, 1 Ill.
275 N.E.2d 685 (1971), earlier instances where contribution had been sought from nonprobate assets, and had been rejected in favor of the rule that the total liability is borne by the
residuary estate.
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siduary assets."6
Perhaps the supreme court did not discuss the burden on the
residue rule because it assumed the continued viability of the rule,
or, alternatively, because it was not essential for deciding the facts
of Gowling. The Gowling residuary estate was so small that it
would be extinguished by taxes, and the rules of abatement would
apply. The abatement rules provide that when any given class of
legacies within the probate estate must abate because of an insufficiency, all bequests within that class abate pro rata.67 In Gowling,
application of these rules would have meant that when the residue
was exhausted, the next class of legacies-the bequests to the surviving spouse and the son-would be proportionately charged with
estate tax.
Abatement of the spouse's probate bequest pursuant to the burden on the residue rule must be squared, however, with the exemption granted by Gowling for marital deduction property. Although
the court did not expressly address how the two rules fit together,
Gowling may simply be viewed as a gloss on the rules of apportionment and the rules of abatement. That is, residuary assets will
contribute to taxes apportioned to the probate estate to the extent
possible; when these are exhausted, apportionment will follow the
scheme of pro rata abatement, with an exception carved out for
qualified maritial deduction bequests. 8
While Gowling did not expressly discuss the burden on the residue rule, neither did it disavow the rule.69 Viewed in this manner,

66. 77 Ill.
App. 3d at 554, 396 N.E.2d at 86.
67. See note 52 supra.
68. This is indeed how the Gowling appellate court resolved the issue. 77 Ill. App. 3d at
553-54, 396 N.E.2d at 86.
69. The court did mention the Fairchildopinion in rejecting the remainder tenants' argument that they should be relieved of estate tax liability. The court distinguished the
Fairchild denial of apportionment as being based upon "(1) [the] mistaken premise that
apportionment was not appropriate in testate estates, absent legislative authorization, and
(2) because of its reliance on the rule that Federal estate taxes are payable in toto from the
residuary estate if that estate is sufficient to pay such taxes." 82 Ill. 2d at 24-25, 411 N.E.2d
at 270.
The court's emphasis on the words "in toto" supplies further evidence that it was assuming the residue rule remains relevant. At least one commentator, however, has construed
Gowling as foresaking the burden on the residue rule. Casteel, Equitable Apportionment of
Federal Estate Taxes-The Expanding Doctrine, 69 ILL. B.J. 538 (1981). But see Borden,
EquitableApportionment in Illinois:A Dramatic Change in the Administration of Estates,
62 CH. B. REc. 300 (1981) in which the author agrees that Gowling left the rule intact. At
least one appellate court since the 1980 apportionment decisions has similarly viewed equitable apportionment as not inconsistent with the traditonal burden on the residue rule, and
has stated that it remains law in Illinois. See In re Estate of Maddux, 93 Ill. App. 3d 435,
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the court's analysis remains consistent with that rule and provides
a new dimension for the rules of apportionment and abatement in
Illinois.
The appellate court opinion in Gowling, as affirmed, represents
two different rules to be applied to testate estates, absent a direction in the will regarding the payment of taxes. First, like Roe, it
provides that "to the extent nonprobate assets exist which generate estate tax liability contribution may be sought on a proportionate basis.

'7 0

It also delineates a second new rule that "[t]he pro-

portionate share of tax attributable to the probate assets of the
estate (excluding the property qualifying for the marital deduction) shall be borne to the extent possible by the residue. ...
All questions regarding equitable apportionment in Illinois, however, were not answered by Gowling. The equitable doctrine first
favored contribution from nonprobate takers under Roe; it then
precluded contribution from a spouse whose bequest qualified for
the marital deduction under Gowling. Still unclear, however, was
whether the doctrine would apply to a spouse who renounces the
will, and takes her share under the statute. The Grant case provided the Illinois court with an opportunity to test the limits of
Gowling's holding regarding the marital deduction in this new
context.
In re

ESTATE OF GRANT

Background
The expansive principles of equity underlying the portion of the
Gowling decision regarding the marital deduction suggested that
the court would be active in further developing the equitable apportionment doctrine. Equitable apportionment was hailed as a
dramatic change in estate administration, and predictions were
made as to its application to intestacy, forced heirship, and gifts to
charity. Among these speculations was the important question of
whether the share of a surviving spouse who elects to take against
a deceased spouse's will would be charged with federal estate tax
liability, where the elective share did not generate any of that
liability.

72

417 N.E.2d 260, 269 (1981).
70. 77 IlM.App. 3d 553-54, 396 N.E.2d at 86.
71. Id.
72. See generally, Borden, Equitable Apportionment in Illinois: A Dramatic Change in
the Administration of Estates, 62 CHI. B. REc. 300 (1981); Casteel, Equitable Apportion-
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Illinois law provides that regardless of whether a testator has
made any provision for his spouse in his will, his widow may renouce that will and take a statutory share of one-third or twothirds of his entire estate, depending upon whether or not the testator left a descendant.73 This elective share qualifies for the marital deduction, 7 ' so that the amount passing to the surviving spouse
can be deducted from the adjusted gross estate75 in arriving at the
taxable estate. 76 The question raised in Grant, however, was the
meaning of "entire estate" as expressed in the statute. In answering this question, the°Grant court did not focus on the statutory
language as it related to property concepts of probate and nonprobate assets, but rather on how the words "entire estate" interfaced
with tax concepts: one-third of the "entire estate" could mean onethird before provision had been made for taxes, or one-third after
taxes had been allocated. For the sake of convenience, the two interpretations the court considered could be referred to as a spousal
share based on the adjusted gross estate, or one based on the net
estate.77 In subsequent references to these two approaches, an estate consisting entirely of probate assets is assumed. 8
ment of Federal Estate Tax-the Expanding Doctrine, 69 ILL. B.J. 538 (1981).
73. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 110 2, V 2-8(a) (1979) provides:
If a will is renounced by the testator's surviving spouse . . . the surviving
spouse is entitled to the following share of the testator's estate after payment of
all just claims: 3 of the entire estate if the testator leaves a descendant or /2 of
the entire estate if the testator leaves no descendant.
74. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(c) (1981).
75. The adjusted gross estate is determined after subtracting from the gross estate such
expenses as funeral and administrative expenses, claims against the estate, certain state and
foreign death taxes, and losses. I.R.C. §§ 2053, 2054.
76. The value of the taxable estate is determined by deducting from the gross estate
specific deductions allowed under the Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. § 2051. The most important of these are the marital and charitable deductions allowed under I.R.C. §§ 2056 and
2055.
77. After the value of the taxable estate has been determined, see note 76 supra, the
value of the aggregate amount of taxable gifts made by the decedent after 1976, which have
not been included in valuing his gross estate, is added to the value of the taxable estate.
I.R.C. § 2001(b)(1). A tentative tax is computed based on this amount, which is then offset
by the amount of gift tax the decedent has paid on his post-1976 gifts. The result is the
gross estate tax. A number of credits are then applied to the gross estate tax, the most
important of which is the unified credit. I.R.C. § 2010. The other four credits include the
credits for state and foreign death taxes, the credit for federal estate taxes paid on certain
prior transfers, and the credit for gift taxes paid on gifts made before 1977 which have been
included in valuing the gross estate. I.R.C. §§ 2011, 2014, 2013, 2012. The net estate tax is
arrived at after these credits have been taken. The net estate is that which remains after
this net estate tax has been paid. See generally H.R. REP. No. 94-1380, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
11-12 (1976).
78. It is necessary to assume a gross estate consisting entirely of probate assets because
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Computation Based on the Adjusted Gross Estate

If "entire estate" is construed to mean the gross or adjusted
gross estate, the surviving spouse receives the largest possible fractional share, all of which can be claimed by the estate as a deduction from the federal tax. The remaining one-half or two-thirds
share of the adjusted gross estate becomes the basis for the taxable
estate. The ultimate consequence of using the gross or adjusted
gross estate for figuring the spouse's fractional share is that the
property received upon renunciation, as well as the amount the estate can claim as a marital deduction, is maximized. Since this usually translates into a diminished tax bill for the estate, the spouse,
and the estate as a taxable entity, are the primary beneficiaries of
this approach.
The beneficiaries under the will, however, do not generally benefit by so maximizing the marital deduction because the tax burden,
although diminished, must be borne by them alone; that is, the tax
must be carried by property that is not passing to the spouse. The
federal statute does not permit property for which a deduction has
been taken to bear any part of the estate tax;7 9 it provides that the

estate deduct only that amount actually received by the spouse.
Therefore, although figuring the fractional share from the gross or
adjusted gross estate maximizes the share for the spouse, and minimizes the estate's tax liability as a whole, it is disadvantageous for
beneficiaries under the will. Having no doubt been disappointed by
the spouse's election, beneficiaries are further dismayed to see
their bequests shrink further to pay taxes.
Computation Based on the Net Estate
The widow's fractional share of the "entire estate" can alternatively be based on a fraction of the net estate, or of what remains
after provision has been made for the payment of taxes.80 Basing
the fractional share on the net estate effectively means that the
spouse participates in tax apportionment, since the value of the
nonprobate gifts will have bearing on the value of both the gross and the net estate. See
notes 7 and 77 supra. An Illinois forced heir cannot generally claim a share in nonprobate
assets. See note 129 infra. Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court in Grant passed over a significant opportunity to determine whether the words "entire estate" were meant to bring both
probate and nonprobate assets within the scope of the elective share. Such a question does
not appear to have been before the court, however.
79. I.R.C. § 2056(b)(4)(A) requires that the value of the interest passing to the surviving
spouse be reduced by any death taxes payable out of the spouse's interest.
80. See notes 76-78 supra.
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net estate reflects that which remains after taxes have been provided for.81 Because the spouse's fractional share of the net estate
qualifies for the marital deduction, its value will have been subtracted from the gross estate in determining the taxable estate, but
will at the same time have to accurately reflect the precise amount
received by the spouse.82 Thus, use of the net estate approach requires that determination of the spouse's share be interrelated
with a working estimate of the ultimate amount of tax liability.
The value of the marital deduction must decrease to reflect the
fractional amount of the net estate, increasing the value of the net
estate, and ultimately the amount of taxes to be paid.8" The size of
the net estate from which the marital deduction fractional share is
to be determined reduces correspondingly. An adjustment of the
size claimed as a marital deduction must again be made; the process repeats itself until an equilibrium is reached between onethird of the amount of the net estate, and the amount actually
claimed as a marital deduction."
Use of a net estate approach to determine the spouse's renunciative share thus translates into a smaller share passing to the
spouse, and greater tax liability for the estate as a whole. Such an
approach is usually more advantageous for beneficiaries under the
will. Because the spouse participates in tax apportionment, the
beneficiaries contribute proportionately less to the overall federal
tax burden. It was this approach, utilizing the value of the net estate as the computational basis for the spouse's fractional share,
which Illinois adopted judicially with the Northern Trust Co. v.
Wilson decision. s5
Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson
In Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, the First District interpreted
81. See note 77 supra.
82. See notes 76 and 79 supra.
83. The process is further complicated by the credit against the tentative tax given by
I.R.C. § 2011 for any state death taxes paid. See note 77 supra. As the size of the spousal
share varies, so too will the amount to be paid out of it for state inheritance tax. This
amount taken as a credit will also reduce the value of the share passing to the spouse, and
thus, the amount allowed to be claimed as a marital deduction. See note 79 supra.
84. The quantum of liability can be determined through using'a trial and substitution
method, or an algebraic formula. For an explanation of the two techniques, see I.R.S. Publication 904, (Rev. Nov. 1979), Computing the Interrelated Charitable,Marital, and Orphans' Deductions and Note, Estate and Gift Tax: Federal Estate Tax-Burden of the
MaritalShare, 33 OKLA. L. Rev. 384 (1980).
85. 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E.2d 604 (1951).
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the Illinois statute for forced heirship in light of the then newly
enacted marital deduction provision; the court concluded that the
fractional share must be computed from the value of the net es-

tate, that is, the value of the estate as reduced by taxes.
Wilson involved a widow who argued that her statutory share in

lieu of dower, which qualified for the marital deduction, should be
calculated before any taxes were subtracted from the estate. In ex-

amining the relevant section of the Probate Act," the court emphasized that the spouse was entitled to her share "after payment
of all just claims." The focus of the inquiry was whether the federal estate tax constituted a "just claim." Noting that the Probate
Act classified "debts due the United States" as a third class
claim, 7 the court elaborated upon Illinois precedents which

treated estate tax as a debt or an expense of administration that
falls upon the corpus of the estate." The court in Wilson thus in-

ferred that the statute mandated that the tax be subtracted before
determining distributive shares, therefore necessitating a net estate
approach.
Wilson remained settled law for almost thirty years. In its own
time, and later, it was considered an "equitable apportionment"
decision, and a first step toward developing that doctrine in Illinois. s9 However, as the doctrine developed outside of Illinois, "equitable apportionment" in the context of a surviving spouse renouncing a will typically meant that her share would be based
upon a fraction of the gross, rather than the net, estate. 90 This is

ILL. Rzv. STAT. ch. 3, § 168 (1939) provided:
When a will is renounced by the testator's surviving spouse . . . the surviving
spouse is entitled to the following share of the testator's estate after payment of
all just claims:
(a) if the testator leaves a descendant, one-third of the personal estate and onethird of each parcel of real estate of which the testator died seized and in which
the surviving spouse does not perfect his right to dower ...
87. 344 Ill. App. at 511, 101 N.E.2d at 606, 607, referring to ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 202
(1949).
88. Id. at 513-14, 101 N.E.2d at 606-07. The Wilson court, as would the Grant court,
relied upon First Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 383 Ill.
489, 50 N.E.2d 461 (1943) for the proposition
that the tax fell
on the corpus of the estate. Actually, in classifying the federal tax as an
"item of expense," the Hart court was merely clarifying the difference between an estate tax
and an inheritance or succession tax. 383 IIl. at 497, 50 N.E.2d at 464-65.
89. Kahn, Probate and Trust Questions, 40 ILL. B.J. 400 (1951); Lauritzen, Apportionment of FederalEstate Taxes, 1 TAx COUNSELOR'S Q. 51 (1957); Comment, Federal Estate
Tax Apportionment, 16 DE PAUL L. RV. 112 (1966).
90. That is, although jurisdictions were split on the question, those invoking "equitable
apportionment" would often find contrary to Wilson; that is, the spouse would be exempted
from apportionment by finding that her forced share was a fraction of the gross estate. See,
86.
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because, under the net estate approach, the spouse in effect participates in the apportionment of the tax.9 ' The equitable principles
developed in Roe v. Farrellrequired that one's share only contribute to paying taxes in proportion to the extent it has generated
them.2 Therefore, after Roe v. Farrell, courts and commentators
began to question whether, almost thirty years later, Wilson was
still sound.
Farley v. United States3 was the first case after Roe to challenge Wilson, and suggest that Wilson had been overruled. The
Third District court in In re Estate of Comstock" agreed with the
court in Farley.
Has Wilson Been Reversed? In re Estate of Comstock
In re Estate of Comstock involved a spouse who sought an elective share free from federal tax contribution, that is, based upon
the gross estate. The circuit court, following Northern Trust Co. v.
Wilson, ruled that she was entitled to a fraction of the net estate.
On appeal, the spouse argued that Roe supported apportionment
based on the gross probate estate, and the Third District Court
agreed.
The Comstock court viewed the statute as defining property
rights in the spouse which pass subject to the claims of creditors.
That is, the statute established that the spouse was entitled to
one-half or one-third of an "entire estate," and required that title
to that property pass subject to all claims . 5 According to Cornstock, the statute's only express direction as to computation was,
with respect to computing one-half or one-third for the elective
share out of the entire estate; the statute specifically did not direct
how taxes were to be computed."
The language "after payment of all just claims" was not a direction that taxes be paid before computing the forced heir's share,
7
but merely was a condition delaying the time for distribution.9
e.g., Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486 (4th Cir. 1955) (South Carolina law); Spurrier v. First
Nat'l Bank, 207 Kan. 406, 485 P.2d 209 (1971); Jones v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. 1964);
Seymour Nat'l Bank v. Heideman, 133 Ind. App. 104, 178 N.E.2d 771 (1961); Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9 (1952).
91. See notes 80-85 supra and accompanying text.
92. See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text.
93. 581 F.2d 821 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
94. 78 Ill. App. 3d 933, 397 N.E.2d 1240 (1979).
95. Id. at 939, 397 N.E.2d at 1244.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 938, 397 N.E.2d at 1244.
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Thus, the court held that the elective share of the surviving spouse
be computed before payment of all just claims, or based upon the
value of the gross estate, with the consequence that the spouse not
be required to contribute to federal estate taxes. However, the appellate court and supreme court, considering In re Estate of Grant,
reached the opposite conclusion.9 8
Grant Ratifies the Wilson Approach
In re Estate of Grant involved a surviving husband who elected
to take against his wife's will, and sought to have his statutory
share calculated based upon the value of the entire gross estate.
Thus, federal taxes would be paid only from that portion that remained after he claimed his forced share. Although the circuit
court found for the spouse, the appellate court reversed, holding
that the spouse's share should be based upon the net estate, that
is, the amount remaining after federal estate tax had been paid.
The Illinois Supreme Court Decision
In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court considered the tax impact of the elective share statute for the first time since the enactment of the marital deduction. The court affirmed Grant,99 thereby
reversing Comstock. At the outset, the Grant court noted that Roe
had recognized only two obstacles to the application of equitable
apportionment: a manifestation of contrary intent by the legislature, or by the decedent in his will. 100 While the Roe court had
found nothing to prevent apportionment in section 18-10 and 1814 of the Probate Act, the court had not considered the significance of the Illinois forced heir statute. 10 1
The Grant court carefully and comprehensively construed the
elective share statute. Although the principles of equitable apportionment set forth in Roe and extensively relied upon in Gowling
are conspicuously absent in the court's analysis, other important
elements of the Roe decision remain: the court's careful deference
to the legislature's perogatives, and its concern for stability in the
law as perceived by the legal profession.
The current statute providing for spousal renunciation bears a
strong resemblance to the predecessor statute construed in Wilson;
98. 77 Ill. App. 3d 866, 396 N.E.2d 872 (1979); 83 11. 2d 379, 415 N.E.2d 416 (1980).
99. 83 Ill.
2d 379, 415 N.E.2d 416 (1980).
100. Id. at 382, 415 N.E.2d at 417.
101. Id.
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"the surviving spouse is entitled to the following share . . .after
payment of all just claims ....",102 The Grant court concluded
that, almost thirty years later, the Illinois statute as amended still
manifests clear legislative intentions that the spouse's share be calculated based on the value of the net estate.10 3 "After payment of
all just claims" was construed as limiting the spouse's share to the
value of a fraction of the net estate, rather than delaying distribution of a larger share. 10 With this conclusion, the court rejected
the interpretation of the statute set forth in Comstock.
The Grant court examined the meaning of "entire estate" in the
context of the statute's grant of "one-third of the entire estate."' 0 5
Referring to earlier statutes, the court determined that that phrase
was not meant to distinguish a "gross" from a "net" estate, but it
had simply been substituted for references made to real and personal property. 0 6
Since no new meaning was derived from "entire estate," the
court looked to prior Illinois statutes in order to compare the types
of property interests that the forced heir took. Former statutes of
dower gave the spouse a life estate free from the claims of creditors, whereas now, upon renunciation, the spouse takes "a fee interest which is subject to claims against the estate."'0 7 Similarly,
earlier Illinois statutes in lieu of dower only gave the spouse a fractional share after payment of all just debts and claims. 0 8 Having
determined that the spouse took her share subject to all just
claims, the next inquiry was whether the federal estate tax was
such a "just claim."
Turning to the Probate Act, the court's analysis strongly resembles that of Wilson; indeed, it cites many of the same authorities.
First, the current Probate Act, like the earlier act construed in
Wilson, classifies "[d]ebts due the United States" as third class
claims against the estate. 10 9 Secondly, Illinois case law indicates
that these debts "fall upon the corpus of the estate and [should]

102.
103.
104.

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2,1 2-8(a) (1979). See note 73 supra.
83 Ill.
2d at 382, 415 N.E.2d at 418.
Id. at 387, 415 N.E.2d at 420.

105.

Id. at 384, 415 N.E.2d at 418.

106.

Id.

107. Id.
108. The court observed that this had been Illinois practice, according to Professor
James, "[firom earliest times." Id. at 384-85, 415 N.E.2d at 419, citing 1 JAMES, ILLINOIS
PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE, § 18 (1951).

109. Id. citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 1 18-10 (1979).
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be considered an item of expense."11 0 Like Wilson, the Grant court
interpreted these factors as mandating that such debts be* paid
before computing the forced heir's fractional share.
Finally, focusing on legislative intent, the court noted that the
judicial construction given the statute by Wilson had long been
followed."' Yet, the court continued, despite the many amendments to the Probate Act since 1951, the legislature had seemingly
neglected to enact any changes which could implement the tax advantage of the marital deduction for the forced heir statute." 2
Therefore, the court concluded, Wilson must accurately reflect the
intentions of the Illinois General Assembly." 3
Grant's Analogy to the Statute of Descent
In reaching its conclusion regarding the net estate versus the
gross estate basis for computing the spouse's fractional share, the
Grant court analogized to the statute of descent and distribution." 4 That analogy suggests that the supreme court may have
dismissed the gross estate approach espoused by Comstock too
lightly.
The court noted that Comstock had interpreted "after payment
of all just claims" as merely delaying the time for distributing fractional shares based on the gross estate, rather than requiring that
fractional shares be based on the value of the net estate." 5 The
Grant court believed that such an interpretation would break
down in the context of the similarly-worded statute of descent.
That is, the court thought that if the effect of "after payment of all
just claims" was merely to delay distribution of a spouse's and the
descendants' respective one-half property interest in the intestate's
gross estate, nothing would remain in the estate from which claims
against the estate could be satisfied." 6 However, this is not necessarily so. As an estate tax, the federal tax is laid upon the-transfer
of the estate, and therefore necessarily attaches before distribution."1 7 Although typically the tax is indeed paid upon distribution,
110.
N.E.2d
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

Id. at 385-86, 415 N.E.2d at 419, citing First Nat'l Bank v. Hart, 383 Ill. 489, 497, 50
461, 464-65 (1943).
Id. at 387, 415 N.E.2d at 420.
Id. at 388, 415 N.E.2d at 420.
Id. at 387-88, 415 N.E.2d at 420.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 2(1) (1979). See note 137 infra.
83 Ill.
2d at 381, 415 N.E.2d at 418.
Id.
See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
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the amount of the tax is necessarily computed based upon the size
and character of the distributive shares; that is, it is based upon
property interests adjudicated under state law." 8 Therefore, the
value of the shares descending under state law must be determined
prior to, or concurrently with, the amount of the tax.
Thus, a one-third/two-thirds determination under the statute of
descent and distribution would merely constitute a property determination under state law to which the federal tax would affix. The
tax would then be calculated based upon these respective rights. If
the spousal share met the limitation requirements of the marital
deduction,1 19 the estate could deduct the full amount. The remaining two-thirds share would comprise the taxable estate, and would
therefore be responsible for paying any consequent taxes. Distribution would thus take place, as in most estates, after payment of all
just claims.
To summarize, respective property rights would be determined
before federal tax liability was even considered; and because the
federal tax is determined "by the fact distribution is about to begin,"1 0 this seems a reasonable interpretation. By requiring that
the tax be identified before determining the spouse's share, the
Grant court seems to employ a fiction. It requires that the spouse's
share not be determined until after the payment of taxes, in a situation where taxes cannot be determined until the spouse's property right has crystallized. Because state property interests and
federal tax liability therefore become interrelated, their determina1 21
tion must take place simultaneously.
Summary
The Grant court considered two potential interpretations of the
statute: an interpretation based on a fractional share of the gross
estate, or one based on a fraction of the net estate. Consistent with
the 1951 Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson decision, the court opted
for the net estate approach. In doing so, the court effectively concluded that the spouse's property interest is based upon a tax
which is assessed upon the property interest. The conclusion seems
illogical and was perhaps not one the court was compelled to reach,
ignoring the precedent of Wilson as generally accepted law for

118.
119.
120.
121.

See note 4 supra.
See note 35 supra.
New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
See notes 79-89 supra and accompanying text.
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thirty years. Its logic aside, Grant represents a valid identification
of the property interest being transferred, and federal tax liability
will be based upon this state identification of that interest.'2 2
RECONCILING GRANT WITH GOWLING

Although Gowling and Grant both dealt with the interplay between the marital deduction and the determination of the surviving spouse's property rights in probate, the two cases' results seem
to contradict each other. Of the three elements of analysis evident
in varying degrees in the Roe and Gowling decisions, equitable
contribution, legislative intent, and stability in the administration
of estates, only the latter two appear in any degree in the Grant
decision. The principles of equity which dominated the court's
holding in Gowling were completely absent in Grant. The Illinois
court was willing to upset the status quo in Gowling, but was unwilling to do so in Grant. Whether the decisions can be reconciled
can be determined by focusing on four aspects of the tax apportionment issue: the source of the spouse's property rights, established legislative and judicial policy in Illinois, the principle of
"equality is equity," and the intent of Congress in enacting the
marital deduction. The latter two aspects of the apportionment issue appear to have been totally ignored by the Grant court.
The Source of the Spouse's Rights
The respective sources of the surviving spouses' rights partially
explain the apparent inconsistency between the two apportionment
cases. The Gowling widow took under a will; the Grant widower
took under the elective share statute. In determining the quantum
of these respective rights, the court was obliged to construe the
intentions of the grantor of such rights. In Gowling, the court construed a will; in Grant, it construed a statute. Different rules of
construction apply in each case. 123 While pragmatic considerations
122. See note 4 supra. There is some administrative inconvenience in determining tax
liability and the spouse's distributive share through the algebraic formulae necessitated by
Grant. See note 84 supra. Some commentators have pointed to that inconvenience as a
reason for not computing the elective share in this manner, and at least one court has considered this in its analysis. Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1965). Nevertheless,
the inconvenience in arriving at the valuation of a property interest through algebra does
not render it invalid, nor does it indicate that the statute is being improperly construed.
Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 481 (1942) dispelled any assumption that
"alegbraic formulae are not likely to be imputed to legislators."
123. The construction of a will resembles that of a statute in the sense that plain and
ordinary meaning are assigned to words, and the document is examined as a whole. Feder v.
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may occasionally influence a court's determination of the. inten-

tions of a single testator,"2 4 its latitude is arguably more limited
when it inquires into the intentions of the legislature. Even when
determining legislative intent, however, courts in some states have
construed language similar to the Illinois forced heir provision, and
have passed the statutory share to the spouse free from the burden
of taxes." 5 Other jurisdictions, however, have construed such lan-

Luster, 54 Ill. 2d 6, 294 N.E.2d 298 (1973). However construction of a will is also influenced
by the strong presumption against intestacy. Baker v. Forsumon, 15 Ill. 2d 353, 155 N.E.2d
24 (1958). As mentioned earlier, rules of construction prevent testators' heirs from being
disinherited through ambiguous language, or from receiving nothing while others receive
double portions. Shea v. Lyons, 47 Ill. App. 2d 187, 198 N.E.2d 151 (1964). Evans v.
DeBruler, 49 Ill. App. 2d 35, 198 N.E.2d 531 (1964). See also note 54 supra.
On the other hand, where a statute has been judicially construed and the legislature has
done nothing subsequently to merit revision of. that interpretation, Illinois courts assume
that that construction is accurate. People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d 840, cert.
denied, 402 U.S. 972 (1970). This rule of construction strongly influenced the Grant court.
83 Ill. 2d at 388, 415 N.E.2d at 420, citing, Union Elec. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n, 77
Ill. 2d 364 (1979).
Nevertheless, other rules of construction suggest that the supreme court in Grant might
have been more flexible in its interpretation. Construing a statute as a whole has meant that
each section is considered in terms of the statute's general purpose. Miller v. Department of
Registration and Educ., 75 Ill. 2d 76, 387 N.E.2d 200 (1979). Similarly, proper interpretation
is based, not simply on language, but on the "nature, objects and the consequences which
would result construing it one way or another." Andrews v. Foxworthy, 71111. 2d 13, 26, 373
N.E.2d 1332, 1335, citing Carrigan v. Illinois Liquor Comm'n, 19 Ill. 2d 230, 233, 166 N.E.2d
574, 576 (1960). Considering these rules, one wonders whether the supreme court could have
approached Grant in a more functional mode.
124. The Gowling court in effect created a presumption in favor of the surviving spouse
to be applied in cases where tax consequences have been ignored or forgotten in the will.
Although the court did not indicate that it was basing its holding on any assessment of the
testator's intent, it presumably was inferring that apportionment in favor of the spouse was
what the testator intended. An inference that the testator would wish to maximize the marital deduction, both for his spouse and his estate, has been key in ordering apportionment
which favors the spouse. See, e.g., Dodd v. United States, 345 F.2d 715 (3d Cir. 1965); see
also note 155 infra and accompanying text.
125. Pitts v. Hamrick, 228 F.2d 486, 489 (4th Cir. 1955) (South Carolina law) ("one-third
of the estate"); Spurrier v. First Nat'l Bank, 207 Kan. 406, 485 P.2d 209, 211-12 (1971)
("After the payment of reasonable funeral expenses, expenses of last sickness, and costs of
administration, taxes, and debts"); Jones v. Jones, 376 S.W.2d 210, 213-14 (Mo. 1964) ("onehalf of the estate"); Hammond v. Wheeler, 347 SW.2d 884, 888 (Mo. 1961) ("one-half of the
real and personal estate . . . subject to the payment of the husband's debts"); Seymour
Nat'l Bank v. Heideman, 133 Ind. App. 104, 178 N.E.2d 771, 776 (1961) ("one-third of the
net personal and real estate"); Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E.2d 9, 14
(1952) ("such personal property shall be distributed . . . one-third to the surviving
spouse").
In Spurrier;Heideman, and Huber, the courts further based their decisions for apportionment in favor of the dissenting spouse on their powers as courts of equity. The Illinois
forced heir statute, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 2-8(d)(1979) grants a court power to "abate
from or add to the legacies in such a manner as to apportion the loss or advantage" brought
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guage as Illinois has in Grant.2 Regardless of how the Grant
court could have construed the statute, the statutory source of the
property right, as well as the rules of construction applied when
interpreting that right, provides some basis for reconciling the
Gowling and Grant decisions.
Underlying Policy Considerations
The policies underlying the Gowling decision were apparently
contradicted by the Grant finding. In exempting the surviving
spouse of a testate decedent from participating in federal estate
tax apportionment, the Gowling court relied on two premises of
Illinois law. One was that the "[plrotection of the interest of the
widow. . . has been a part of Illinois statutory and judicial policy
since 1787;" another was that "it is inequitable to require a widow
whose property generated no tax to contribute to the payment of
tax generated by property received by others. 1 27 If these principles were applicable in maximizing a spouse's share where the decedent died testate, but left no direction as to how taxes were to be
paid, it seems that these underlying premises should be equally applicable in evaluating and implementing statutory forced heirship.
The statutory source of the dissenting spouse's right apparently
presents different questions of policy from those raised where a
spouse takes under a will. Forced heirship is a right given in spite
of a testator's wishes1 28 and in this sense is in conflict with the
testator's right to dispose of his property however he wishes. Illiabout by the spouse's renunciation of the will. Based on these equitable powers, perhaps the
Grant court could have reached a different conclusion.
126. In re Estate of Mosby, 170 Mont. 463, 554 P.2d 1341, 1342 (1976) ("two-thirds of
the husband's net estate, real and personal, after the payment of creditors, claims, expenses
of administration and any and all taxes, including state and federal inheritance and estate
taxes"); In re Estate of Hurlbut, 126 Vt. 562, 238 A.2d 68, 69 (1967) ("not less than a third,
after payment of debts, funeral charges and expenses of administration"); In re Estate of
Glover, 45 Haw. 569, 371 P.2d 361, 362 (1962) ("one-third part ... after the payment of all
his just debts"); Old Colony Trust Co. v. McGowan, 156 Me. 138, 163 A.2d 538, 540 (1960)
("The personal estate... shall be applied first to the payment of his debts, funeral charges
and charges of settlement; and the residue shall be distributed. . . 1/3to the widow"); Guaranty Nat'l Bank v. Mitchell, 111 S.E.2d 494, 495 (W. Va. 1959) ("one-third after payment of
funeral expenses, charges of administration and debts"); Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St.
203, 122 N.E.2d 695, 697 (1954) ("one-half of the net estate"); In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis.
362, 59 N.W.2d 641, 648 (1953) ("one-third part of his net personal estate").
127. 82 Ill. 2d at 23, 411 N.E.2d at 270, citing Farley v. United States, 581 F.2d at 834.
See notes 61-64, supra and accompanying text.
128. First Nat'l Bank v. McMillan, 12 Ill. 2d 61, 145 N.E.2d 60 (1957); Gowling v. Gowling, 405 Ill. 165, 90 N.E.2d 188 (1950); In re Estate of Klekanas, 56 Ill. App. 2d 70, 205
N.E.2d 497 (1965).
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nois interpretations of the spouse's right of forced heirship have to
some extent recognized this tension, and have only moderately
protected the forced heir's share.12 9 In this way, Grant remains

129. A review of Illinois statutory and judicial policy regarding forced heirship exceeds
the scope of this note. For a review of this policy, as well as a recommendation for model
legislation, see Note, A Response to Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank: Restoring Forced
Share Protection for the Surviving Spouse, 1980 ILL. L.F. 277. This article evaluates Johnson v. LaGrange, 73 Ill. 2d 342, 382 N.E.2d 185 (1978), where the question was raised
whether the assets of various inter vivos trusts could be reached in reckoning a spouse's
forced share. Johnson rejected the "intent to defraud spouse's rights" test of Newman v.
Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E.2d 966 (1937), thus precluding the inclusion of nonprobate assets
for determining the one-third share.
One should note, however, that although that author urged that the legislature ought to
overrule the test of "retained control" and hence extend more protection to the forced share
through the Lifetime Transfers of Property Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1101/2, 601 (1979), the
Johnson v. LaGrange court prospectively interpreted that statute, and read it as the legislature's rejection of the fraud on spouse's rights theory. 73 Ill. 2d at 358-59, 383 N.E.2d 197.
One might assume, therefore, that although the legislature is sympathetic to the needs of
the widow, it still wishes to defer somewhat to the testator, despite the fact that his intentions are irrelevant when the spouse takes her share. This would explain the approach taken
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Grant, in interpreting the tax treatment of the forced
share provision. See note 78 supra.
The Grant or Wilson approach, which reduces the forced share by taxes, has not gone
uncriticized. See, e.g., Carroll, Interplay of Probate Assets and Nonprobate Assets in the
Administration of Estates, 25 DE PAUL L. REV. 363 (1975); Flynn, Estate Tax Apportionment and the Marital Share in Illinois-A Modest Proposal,58 ILL. B.J. 996 (1970). Note,
A Response to Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank: Restoring Forced Share Protection for
the Surviving Spouse, 1980 ILL. L.F. 277. Nonetheless, some commentators have agreed
with the Wilson approach, characterizing it as an equitable apportionment decision. See
note 89 supra. See also, Comment, Equitable Apportionment of the Federal Tax Liability,
1979 U. ILL. L.F. 703 (suggests clarifying legislation, but believes the forced heir's share
should be figured as in Wilson, except in cases of post mortem estate planning).
Regardless of whether the Grant approach is desirable, it should be noted that other decisions, not dealing with the rights of the dissenting spouse, have to a limited extent had a
favorable tax impact upon her share. By requiring that the tax generated by nonprobate
assets be apportioned to them, Gowling has somewhat limited the frequency of tax disinheritance of the renouncing spouse. Such disinheritance would occur by operation of the burden on the residue rule: since the dissenting spouse's share is limited to a fraction of the
probate estate, and the burden on the residue rule required that probate assets bear the tax
burden generated by the transfer of nonprobate assets, the probate estate could be completely exhausted before the spouse could take her share. Nonetheless, Gowling's benefits to
the renouncing spouse, of apportionment between probate and nonprobate assets, can be
avoided by the drafting of a will which directs that all taxes be paid from the probate estate.
In this sense the tax situation of the renouncing spouse is now worse than it was at the
time of Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 sought to unify the
structure of the estate and gift taxes by adding to the value of the taxable estate the aggregate amount of taxable gifts made by the decedent after 1976, which have not been included
in valuing his gross estate. See note 77 supra. A testator could avoid paying tax on these
transfers, and leave a will directing that all taxes be paid from his probate estate. It would
appear that the forced heir's share, which after Johnson v. LaGrange is limited to a portion
of the probate estate, could then only be taken out of that which remains after the taxes on
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consistent with Illinois forced heir policy. Policy considerations
therefore provide some basis for reconciling Grant with Gowling.
Equality is Equity
The principle of "equality is equity," enunciated in Roe and applied in Gowling, was not applied in Grant, and does not provide a
basis for reconciling Grant with Gowling. In Gowling, the court applied this principle to hold that a surviving spouse should not contribute to estate taxes when his or her share did not generate any
tax.-1 0 In Grant, however, the principle was not even mentioned,
and the court in effect required a spouse to contribute to estate
taxes not generated by his or her share. This action by the court
raises the question of whether equality is equity remains a valid
rationale for equitable apportionment. One Illinois appellate court
since Gowling has suggested that it does not. The court stated that
any argument that a gift should be exonerated from contributing
to the estate tax, simply because it was a deductible transfer, had
been "expressly disapproved" by the supreme court in Grant.13 1
Thus, the equality is equity maxim upon which Gowling is based
has been severely undermined, and does not provide any basis
upon which to reconcile the Gowling and Grant decisions.
CongressionalIntent
The intent of Congress in enacting the marital decision, "to allow a portion of the property of a decedent to pass free of the estate tax," 13 2 similarly does not provide a basis upon which to recthese inter vivos transfers had been satisfied.
130. See notes 53-58 supra and accompanying text.
131. In re Estate of Maddux, 93 Ill. App. 3d 435, 438, 417 N.E.2d 266, 269 (1981). In
Maddux, the Fifth District faced the issue of whether charitable residuary legatees were
exempted from contributing to the estate tax. Under I.R.C. § 2055, a deduction from the
gross estate is allowed for the value of property passing to qualified charities. Applying
Gowling's equality is equity rationale, qualified charities would not be obliged to participate
in tax apportionment, as courts in other juridictions had concluded. In re Estate of Rankin,
169 N.J. Super. 317, 404 A.2d 200 (1979); In re Estate of Wahlin, 505 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. App.
1973).
Maddux rejected this rationale, and its conclusion seems correct. Regardless of the dangers of inferring what the intent of "most testators" would be, one might suggest that as
between the two motivations a testator might typically have in naming a charitable beneficiary in his will-a desire to benefit charity, and also a desire to obtain a general benefit to
his estate through the use of the § 2055 deduction-one might agree that under ordinary
circumstances charities are not as logical an object of the testator's bounty as is the spouse.
132. See note 64 supra and accompanying text. The intent of Congress argument, as set
forth in Gowling, maintains that, since the marital deduction was designed to correct the
inequities between common law and community property states, any judicial doctrine which
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oncile Gowling with Grant. Although congressional intent has been
invoked in other states as a means of maximizing the marital deduction in a forced heir context,3 s congressional intent is irrelevant to a state law determination of property rights."
The sources of spousal rights and the differing policy considerations relevant to them provide the apparent bases for reconciling
Grant and Gowling. As demonstrated, however, the maxim "equality is equity," and the intent of Congress to protect a surviving
spouse were weak rationale supporting the Gowling decision, and
apparently did not survive it. 3 5
THE IMPACT OF GoWLING AND GRANT

Gowling and Grant may represent the outer limits to which Illinois courts will go in establishing rules of judicial apportionment.
The decisions have implications in three specific areas: the Illinois
statute of descent and distribution, the burden on the residue rule,
and forced heirship as it applies to estate planning.
The Illinois Statute of Descent and Distribution
Because the supreme court in Roe and Gowling recognized that
equitable apportionment is permissible only where it does not defy
the intentions of a testator or of the legislature, the Grant court
was compelled to proceed with caution when it entered areas where
property rights are based upon statute. For this reason, the Grant
court's analogy to the statute of descent and distribution13"6 has obcharges the deductible marital share with federal estate taxes thwarts the intent of Congress. In re Burnett's Estate, 50 N.J. Super. 482, 142 A.2d 695 (1958).
133. See, e.g., In re Burnett's Estate, 50 N.J. Super. 482, 142 A.2d 695 (1958); In re
Rosenfeld's Estate, 376 Pa. 42, 101 A.2d 684 (1956); Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, 240
S.W.2d 89 (Ky. App. 1951).
134. See note 4 supra. The intent of Congress argument is appealing because its acceptance would spawn uniformity among states as to the treatment of the marital share. In
contrast, state determination of property rights can result in the spousal share varying
markedly from state to state. Congress, however, has recognized this. It has provided that,
where as in Illinois the spouse's share is tied to determination of taxes, any tax imposed
upon it must be taken into account in determining the value of the share for purposes of the
marital deduction. See note 79 supra.
The apparent differences resulting in various interpretations of the applicability of the
federal tax to forced heir provisions do not offend the concept of geographic uniformity in
taxation; the Supreme Court has long recognized that tax liability would vary based on
differences in the laws of descent and distribution, and did not consider these variances
unconstitutional. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921); Knowlton v. Moore,
178 U.S. 41 (1899).
135. See notes 130 and 131 supra and accompanying text.
136. See notes 114-121 supra and accompanying text.
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vious implications for spouses taking their shares through intestacy. The language of the intestacy provision is remarkably similar
to that of the elective share provision.13 7 Furthermore, the court's
statement that "plainly under section 2- 1 . . . the legislature intended that claims be paid and the respective interests be calculated from the net estate" forecloses any argument that apportionment should be applied differently to spouses of intestate
decedents than it currently does to spouses who take against a
will. 1 8 Therefore, in light of the court's construction of the elective
share provision, it seems clear that when a spouse takes under the
intestacy statute, her fractional share will be based on the net estate because "all just claims" will be paid before distributive
shares will be determined.
One would hope, however, that the spouse's fractional share in
an intestacy situation would be based on the gross estate. A net
estate reading of the statute seems less plausible for spouses taking
through intestacy than it does for spouses taking upon renunciation. The legislature appears to favor the spouse surviving an intestate decedent more than it does one who seeks a forced share.
For example, the statute of descent and distribution grants the
surviving spouse a greater fraction of the decedent's estate than
that granted by the renunciation statute.l3 9
The surviving spouse's situation differs from that of a spouse
who accedes to property under the intestacy statute in other ways.
Although rights of inheritance under both the statute of descent
and distribution and the forced heir statute are based solely upon
statute, 40 forced heirship represents a legislative grant given in

ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, 2-1 (1979) provides:
The intestate real and personal estate of a resident decedent and the intestate
real estate in this State of a non-resident decedent, after all just claims against his
estate are fully paid, descends and shall be distributed as follows:
(a) If there is a surviving spouse and also a descendant of the decedent: /2 of
the entire estate to the surviving spouse and 1/2 to the decedent's descendants per
stirpes. ...
See note 73 supra for text of the elective share provision.
138. 83 Ill. 2d at 381, 415 N.E.2d at 418.
139. Under ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, T 2-1 (1979) the spouse receives one-half or all of
her husband's estate, depending upon whether he leaves a descendant; under ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110 1/2, 1 2-8(a) (1979), the dissenting spouse receives either one-third or one-half. See
notes 73 and 137 supra.
140. In re Estate of Leichtenberg, 7 Ill. 2d 545, 131 N.E.2d 487 (1956); Eckland v. Jankowski, 407 Ill. 263, 95 N.E.2d 342 (1950); People v. McLaughlin, 403 Ill. 493, 87 N.E.2d 637
(1949).
137.
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spite of a decedent's intentions. 4 Although an intestate's intentions are irrelevant by definition in determining rights under the
intestacy statute, its provisions presumably represent some legislative assessment of the decedent's likely desires, had he died testate.1 42 While courts do not generally inquire into the intentions of
intestate decedents, they have favored equitable apportionment of
the federal estate tax between probate and nonprobate assets in
part because they assumed such to be the likely intention of the
intestate.143 In Roe, the supreme court ratified this approach as applied to intestate estates. Similarly, Gowling affirmed the partial
apportionment approach in those testates estates where the testator had not spoken. Presumably the Gowling conclusion was also
44
based on some assessment of the intent of "most decedents.'
Thus, the probable intent of most testators, as set forth in Gowling, should arguably influence the construction of the intestacy
statute. It seems equally plausible for a court to infer that most
intestate decedents would wish their spouses to take property un145
burdened by the estate tax.
Based on Grant, however, this type of inference, if applied to
intestacy, can only be drawn by the legislature. The court's dictum
regarding intestacy,' 6 as well as its underlying rationale, 47 suggests that the rule that distributive shares can only be determined
after "all just claims" have been paid, is applicable to the statute
of intestate descent. Thus, the spouse's share in intestacy48 will
likely be determined as a fractional share of the net estate."

141. See note 128 supra.
142. The policy that wills are construed to avoid intestacy reflects a solicitude to decedent's intentions. Schuyler v. Zwiep, 42 Ill.
App. 3d 91, 355 N.E.2d 554 (1976). Decedent's
intent, express or implied, is considered, though it will not be decisive when the statute of
descent governs. Tilton v. Tilton, 382 Ill. 426, 47 N.E.2d 454 (1943).
143. In In re Estate of Van Duser, 19 Ill. App. 3d 1022, 313 N.E.2d 228 (1974), the court
based its conclusion in favor of apportionment between probate and nonprobate assets partially on what it assumed would be the intention of the intestate. Id. at 1024, 313 N.E.2d at
229.
144. See notes 53-58 supra and accompanying text.
145. In testate situations where the decedent did not specifically provide for the payment of taxes, other jurisdictions have inferred that he would wish his estate and his spouse
to fully enjoy the benefits of the marital deduction. See note 124 supra. Often this inference
has been made in situations where, as in intestacy, the property interest being devised to
the spouse was expressed as a fractional share which, when combined with other bequests,
added up to 100% of the estate. See notes 155 and 156 infra.
146. See notes 114-121 supra and accompanying text.
147. Id.
148. The spouse of an intestate decedent will benefit from the Roe rule that the tax
attributable to nonprobate transfers will be apportioned to those assets. See notes 13-33
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The Burden on the Residue Rule and The Marital Deduction
Another area left unclear by the apportionment cases is the interrelationship between the burden on the residue rule and apportionment as it applies to the marital share. That is, if a decedent
were to bequeath the residue of his estate to his surviving spouse
and make no direction for the payment of taxes, it is arguable that
the burden on the residue rule would require that the spousal
residual share be the first tapped for the payment of taxes. Such a
question was raised by the tax court several years ago, and the result was not favorable to the spouse. " 9 Gowling's favorable tax
presumption, however, would portend a different result, since the
spousal share was relieved from any obligation to contribute to
taxes.
Regardless of Gowling's favorable tax presumption, an uncertainty remains which is an unfortunate consequence of the supreme court's failure to address the burden on the residue rule.
The question of whether the burden on the residue rule could, in
such a situation, supercede the Gowling rule protecting the spousal
share would depend upon whether Gowling merely represents a
gloss on traditional Illinois abatement practice, " or whether it
was in addition creating a tax saving presumption in favor of the
spouse which will apply regardless of whether her bequest is specific or residual.
If Gowling was merely glossing traditional Illinois abatement
practice, it would be difficult to divert the payment of taxes from a
residuary share bequeathed to a surviving spouse to a general or
specific bequest made to someone else. The Illinois definition of
"residue" militates against this: the residue is the surplus of an
estate, that which remains after legacies have been satisfied.""
Traditionally, because residuary legacies ordinarily cover property
not otherwise disposed of by will, a residuary legatee cannot call
upon general or specific legacies to abate unless the will so pro-

supra and accompanying text.
149. In re Estate of Dawson, 62 T.C. 315 (1974). Since Illinois law charged the residue

with claims and expenses, and these charges exceeded the value of the residue bequeathed
to the spouse, nothing remained to deduct under I.R.C. § 2056.
150. See note 52 supra.
151. In re Estate of Marti, 311 Ill. App. 237, 35 N.E.2d 696, 698 (1941). The court stated
that a specific devise or bequest "shows the testator intends the devisee or legatee shall have
a thing certain, while by a residuary devise or bequest, the devisee. . . shall have something
that is uncertain or which cannot be described with certainty." Id. at 240, 35 N.E.2d at 698.
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vides. 15' In this way, traditional abatement rules would conflict
with protecting the residuary marital deduction share and trying to
divert the payment of taxes to general or specific bequests.' 53
But Gowling seems to create a tax saving presumption in favor
of the surviving spouse which would shift the tax burden from a
marital deduction residue to non-spousal takers in a case where
the entire residue was bequeathed to the spouse. Whether this
would consistently hold true would, of course, depend upon the interpretation of the will involved, since the intent of the testator
would be paramount. Nonetheless, an inference that the testator
wished to maximize the marital deduction has been applied in another state where the decedent passed the residue of his estate to
his wife absolutely, and made no provision for the payment of
taxes.15 4 Similar inferences have been drawn where a testator has
fractionalized his entire estate, and failed to phrase the spousal
share in terms of a marital deduction formula.' 55 Where the will
has passed a fraction of the residue to the spouse, courts in other
jurisdictions have elevated the spousal fraction to the status of a
general bequest, and deemed that portion passing to the other beneficiaries as the true residue for the payment of taxes.'" Thus, it
152.

3 JAMES,

ILLINOIS PROBATE LAW AND PRACTICE

§ 291.6 (1951). See also note 52 supra

and accompanying text.
153. In re Estate of Maddux, 93 Ill. App. 3d 435, 417 N.E.2d 266 (1981) held that residuary charitable beneficiaries could not divert taxes from themselves to other legatees. The
court commented "[tihe burden on the residue rule is an established part of Illinois estate
law. If any presumption is to be relied on it should be that established rules as to the administration of estates have been considered and incorporated into a will." Id. at 438, 417
N.E.2d at 269.
154. In Reed v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 1228 (E.D. Mo. 1970), the testator bequeathed the entire residue to his wife absolutely, but included no clause in the will regarding the payment of taxes; the court found no language in the will disclosing that the testator
intended the bequest to pass subject to tax. Note, however, that the court felt it was unclear
whether Missouri law placed the burden on the residue.
Regardless of any inference a court might draw, it is important to remember that under
the rule of Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967), federal authorities are not bound by
determinations made by a state trial court as to the character of the'property interest transferred by the decedent under state law, where tax liability turns upon the character of that
interest. Thus, to avoid a challenge from the Commissioner, rulings in questionable areas
should be obtained from at least an intermediate level state court.
155. In Adams v. Adams, 261 N.C. 342, 134 S.E.2d 633 (1964), the court held that no
residual estate had been created, and proceeded with an apportionment that exempted the
spousal share. See also Jackson v. Jackson, 217 Kan. 448, 536 P.2d 1400, 1402 (1975) ("1A of
all my personal property"). Despite the resemblance such a testamentary scheme bears to
the statutes of intestacy and forced heirship, there is no reason why such an approach could
not be taken were the question to arise in Illinois.
156. Sawyer v. Sawyer, 53 Ohio App. 2d 323, 374 N.E.2d 166, 167 (1977) (1/3
"of the
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would seem consistent with Gowling to infer that most testators
would intend to maximize the benefits of the marital deduction for
their spouses and their estates.
It therefore seems doubtful that the burden on the residue rule
would ever supercede the Gowling rule that spousal bequests qualifying for the marital deduction are not to be burdened with estate
taxes.15 7 Regardless of whether or not this is true, the burden on
the residue rule is based upon questionable premises; 158 one of
these premises is that it represents what most testators would intend. 5 9e Since the rule only comes into play in cases where the decedent has not spoken, this proposition is easy to question, but difficult to contest. The strength of the rule may be a result of its
longevity; as noted by some courts, countless wills have been
drafted on the assumption that the burden on the residue rule is
0
law. 1
Although there are, no doubt, advantages to the rule, its rationale is weak. Perhaps no better rationale could be set forth for a
contrary rule, for indeed, it is difficult to infer the intentions of
decedents who have not expressed any intentions. Nevertheless,
the burden on the residue rule represents an assumption which the
Illinois legislature will have to address if it should ever consider
statutory treatment for the payment of taxes in decedents' estates.

balance of my estate after payment of all my debts"); Elliot v. Elliot, 349 So. 2d 1092, 1094
(Ala. 1977) (" '/ of the residue"); Davis v. Davis, 267 So. 2d 158, 161 (Ala. 1972) ("onefourth of said residue"); Gesner v. Roberts, 48 N.J. 379, 225 A.2d 697, 698 (1967) ("one-third
of the residue"). Similar treatment preserving an identifiable marital share out of the residue could be predicted in Illinois, given local "residue of the residue" doctrine. This doctrine applies where the testator carves up his estate, devising fractional portions to certain
persons such as his spouse, and then passes "that which remains" to others. "That which
remains" is deemed the "true" residue. O'Connell v. Gaffney, 23 Ill. 2d 611, 179 N.E.2d 647
(1962).
157. But see text accompanying note 71 supra. The appellate court's statement regarding the marital deduction and the burden on the residue rule is ambiguous.
158. The use of residuary clauses in the drafting of wills has changed markedly since the
inception of the burden on the residue rule. At the time when wealth was held primarily in
land, which was likely to be the subject of specific bequests, a testator's residuary estate was
likely to be of little relative value or importance. Now, however, the residuary estate is often
used to transmit the greater wealth in a testator's estate, and is in this way the most important bequest. In this sense, a residuary bequest to the surviving spouse, although not framed
as a marital deduction formula, would likely deserve a favorable presumption that it not be
burdened with the tax.
159. In re Estate of Maddux, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 438, 417 N.E.2d at 269; In re Estate of
Gowling, 77 I1. App. 3d at 554, 396 N.E.2d at 86; In re Estate of Phillips, 1 11. App. 3d at
816, 275 N.E.2d at 688.
160. In re Estate of Phillips, 1 111. App. 3d at 815, 275 N.E.2d at 687; In re Estate of
Maddux, 93 Ill. App. 3d at 438, 417 N.E.2d at 269.
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Forced Heirship by the Spouse
The Grant decision suggests a troublesome implication with respect to estate planning. The importance and application of the
renunciation statute is not limited to the spouse who has been
spitefully disregarded in a will; it is also a practical tool employed
where the spouse's interests under the will fail to qualify for the
marital deduction."' A question arises as to what extent the expressed intention of the testator that the spouse's share be given
the maximum benefit of the marital deduction should operate in
such a potential forced heir situation.
Illinois courts have stated that the purpose of the statutory right
of renunciation is to enable the surviving spouse to elect the
method of taking most advantageous to her. 162 However, this principle has never been considered from a tax perspective. Rather, renunciation is traditionally interpreted as the spouse's rejection of
any and all provisions made for her under the will. The remaining
provisions of the will remain operative upon the property not included in the statutory share.0 3 Therefore, a spouse cannot renounce a will and simultaneously retain a tax advantage that it
confers. This would also be true where direction for payment of
taxes was made without reference to the spouse, such as where the
testator ordered that the taxes be paid from a specific nonmarital
source. The tax clause would only operate upon the property not
included in the statutory share.
Illinois courts have not addressed the precise issue of whether a
spouse can renounce a will and still retain a tax advantage it incidentally confers.' 6" It is extremely doubtful, however, whether the

161. Letter Ruling 7935063 (May 30, 1979) involved such a case. Testator attempted to
devise his spouse a marital deduction gift, but it failed to qualify because it was a terminable interest. The spouse then renounced the will and sought her statutory share free of
estate tax; the will had provided that a residuary charitable trust bear the entire burden of
the estate tax.
The Internal Revenue Service concluded that the spouse had a right to take her share free
of the tax under Illinois law. In doing so, it cited First Nat'l Bank v. McMillan, 12 Iln. 2d 61,
145 N.E.2d 60 (1957) for the proposition that renunciation of the will did not destroy its
effectiveness for other beneficiaries, and reasoned therefore that the residuary charitable
trust would have to bear the entire burden of the tax. Nevertheless, the Service relied most
heavily on the Farley decision, note 61 supra, which the Grant decision overruled.
162. First Nat'l Bank v. McMillan, 12 Ill. 2d 61, 145 N.E.2d 60 (1957); In re Estate of
Donovan, 409 Ill. 195, 98 N.E.2d 757 (1951); In re Estate of Hubbard, 54 Ill. App. 3d 238,
369 N.E.2d 292 (1977).
163. First Nat'l Bank v. McMillan, 12 Ill. 2d at 66, 145 N.E.2d at 64.
164. See note 161 supra.
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spouse could
do so; courts in other jurisdictions have blocked such
5

results. 1
In Illinois, the rights of the spouse are "fixed in the statute by
[her] election, and are not effected by claiming or omitting to claim
any specific estate upon renunciation.' 166 Because Grant effectively held that the spouse's elective right is interrelated with the
estate's tax liability,1 6 ' the testator's direction in the will regarding
the payment of taxes is irrelevant in determining the spouse's
share. Therefore, the net estate approach of Grant will apply in
computing the forced heir's share, regardless of whether the testator's will manifests a desire that the surviving spouse and the estate both realize the full benefit of the marital deduction.
General Implications
Other, more general implications can be drawn from Roe, Gowling and Grant. Grant represents a ratification of the law as established by the appellate court in Wilson in 1951, and Roe represents
an affirmance that the "reliance upon the [1974] holding in Van
Duser ha[d] not been misplaced." ' 1 8 These two decisions could
thus be characterized as "status quo" decisions.
Gowling, however, broke new ground. Gowling indicates that
where a testator's will is silent or ambiguous about whether he
wishes specific property passing to his spouse to contribute to the
payment of taxes, courts may read in a marital deduction savings
clause. Thus, the decision is important because it provides an escape valve for situations where tax consequences have been ignored, forgotten, or incorrectly assessed in the drafting stage.
Illinois courts passing on apportionment questions, regardless of
whether they have ordered apportionment or not, have generally
recognized that ultimately this question is one for the legislature. 6 9 For this reason, it is difficult to accept without criticism the
165. Merchants Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1967)
(Indiana law); In re Estate of Hurlbut, 126 Vt. 562, 238 A.2d 68 (1967); In re Uihlein's Will,
264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W.2d 641 (1953). The tax provisions were construed as made on the
spouse's behalf, and thus lost by her election.
166. In re Estate of Donovan, 409 Ill. at 202, 98 N.E.2d at 762.
167. See notes 114-121 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 32 and 33 supra and accompanying text.
169. In re Estate of Maddux, 93 Ill. App. 3d 435, 417 N.E.2d 266 (1981); In re Estate of
Comstock, 78 Ill. App. 3d 933, 397 N.E.2d 1240 (1979); In re Estate of Fairchild, 21 Ill. App.
3d 459, 315 N.E.2d 658 (1974); In re Estate of Phillips, 1 Ill. App. 3d 813, 275 N.E.2d 685
(1971). Since the question is one for the legislature, the Illinois Supreme Court's two 1980
decisions of Gowling and Grant perhaps signify that Illinois courts are not legislating ad hoc
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supreme court's "no reason why not" approach in setting forth new
rules of equitable apportionment in the Roe and Gowling decisions, once the court had decided that the legislative intentions
presented no obstacle. Even accepting the results of these two
cases, the court's rationale does not square with its strong concurrent concern for stability in the law and predictability for the legal
profession. The court's approach could hamper legislative action
by creating a belief that the task is completed when it is only half
complete: the favorable advantage enjoyed by a wife whose husband dies testate should be extended to a spouse who takes under
the statutes. But, as properly demonstrated by the court's holding
in Grant, this advantage can be conferred only by the
legislature.'"
CONCLUSION

Roe, Gowling, and Grant suggest that if Illinois courts are to implement changes in the payment of taxes out of decedents' estates,
those changes will not occur rapidly, nor will they be radical. Roe
implied change, but was at least partially decided in the interests
of ratifying for the legal profession a decision made by an appellate
court four years earlier. Gowling implemented change, but despite
all of the equities favoring its holding, its rationale was suspect,
and thus perhaps doomed to break down when put to further test.
In a sense, Grant served a purpose similar to Roe, because it ratified an appellate court decision, assuring the legal profession that
probate law would enjoy stability. 7 ' In this way, Grant signalled
that, until the legislature speaks on the matter, the doctrine of equitable apportionment would develop no further than Gowling.
Several conclusions regarding the status of Illinois law flow from
apportionment principles borrowed from other states.
170. Some commentators have favored the adoption of an apportionment statute for Illinois. See, e.g., Borden, Equitable Apportionment in Illinois, 62 Cm. B. REC. 300 (1981);
Fleming, Apportionment of Federal Estate Taxes, 43 ILL. L. REV. 153 (1948); Comment,
Equitable Apportionment of the Federal Tax Liability, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 703.
Others have resisted the idea, or have suggested that judicial apportionment rules would
suffice. See, e.g., 2 R. HUNTER, ESTATE PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATION IN ILLINOIS § 165.1 (2d
ed. 1980); Carroll, Interplay of ProbateAssets and Nonprobate Assets, 25 DE PAUL L. Rv.
363 (1975); Flynn, Estate Tax Apportionment and the Marital Share in Illinois, 58 ILL.
B.J. 996 (1970). The latter two commentators thought that judicial development of apportionment doctrine would suffice; given the direction that judicial development has gone,
their opinions might have changed.
171. Because of this, the Grant opinion is susceptible to criticism. Grant is based upon
the status quo of Wilson, which was in turned based upon dictum. See notes 99-113 supra
and accompanying text; see also notes 86-92 supra and accompanying text.
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this review. Where property rights are derived from a will, the testator's intentions control. Absent an effective direction as to the
payment of taxes, (1) there will be apportionment between probate
and nonprobate assets; (2) the tax burden on the probate estate
will fall upon residuary assets to the extent they are sufficient; and
(3) a gift qualifying for the marital deduction will abate last for
payment of taxes, should the residue prove insufficient. Grant
strongly undermines Gowling's holding that a beneficiary's share
should only contribute to taxes to the extent that it generated
them by limiting that rule to the facts of Gowling.
Where property rights are derived from statute, taxes will also
be apportioned between probate and nonprobate assets. The computation of property rights vis a vis the taxes allocated to probate
assets, however, remains unchanged; the forced heir's share continues to be based upon the net estate, and one can assume that this
holds true for intestate succession. No rationale, other than the
differing sources of the respective property rights, provides a satisfactory explanation for this disparate treatment. In lieu of a comprehensive apportionment statute for Illinois, the statute of descent and distribution, as well as that of forced heirship, should be
amended to accord surviving spouses taking under the statutes the
same tax advantage as that enjoyed by those who take under wills.
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